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Abstract  
Climate change is now a major aspect of public policy. There are almost 500 identified climate 
change laws in the world’s leading economies. This paper reviews the main domestic factors that 
drive this legislation. The analysis is based on a unique dataset of climate legislation in 66 
national jurisdictions for the period 1990-2013. We find that the passage of new climate laws is 
influenced by several factors. One important factor is the quantity and quality of previous 
legislation:  the propensity to pass more laws decreases non-linearly with the stock of existing 
legislation, but increases in the presence of a strategic “flagship law” that sets an overall 
framework for climate policy. Contrary to widespread belief, political orientation is not a decisive 
factor. We find no significant difference in the number of laws passed by left-wing and right-wing 
governments, except perhaps in Anglo-Saxon countries. However, left-leaning governments are 
more inclined to pass laws in difficult economic times. Despite these elements of bipartisanship,   
political economy factors still matter: In democracies climate laws are less likely to be passed 
immediately before an election and legislation is aided by a strong executive that can take on 
vested interests.  
 
Keywords:  climate change legislation, climate politics, political economy. 
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1. Introduction  
Practically all major emitters of greenhouse gases (GHGs) now have in place laws to control 
emissions, conserve energy, avoid deforestation or promote cleaner forms of energy production. 
At the same time, those countries that are vulnerable to climate change are taking steps to prepare 
for its impact. At the end of 2013 there were close to 500 climate or climate-related laws on the 
statute books of 66 major economies. On average, these countries pass a climate change-related 
law every 18 to 20 months (Nachmany et al., 2014).  
The urgency to address climate change, combined with the quantity of laws and policies now 
being issued, makes climate change one of the most important aspects of public policy and a key 
focus of environmental legislation. Understanding the domestic dynamics of climate legislation is 
therefore of academic interest in its own right. There is also a strong interest in this question from 
a practical policy perspective. The international climate architecture is now moving toward a 
system of intended nationally determined contributions, and it is domestic legislation that gives 
credibility to these. Moreover, additional domestic legislation may well be required to achieve 
global climate objectives. 
Existing research indicates that the passage of climate laws is influenced by a combination of 
international factors, such as treaty obligations, and country-specific domestic factors, such as the 
institutional context or the energy-economic situation (Never and Betz, 2014; Falkner, 2013; 
Bernstein and Cashore, 2012; Busch et al., 2005 and Kern et al., 2001). Yet until now there has 
been no attempt to explain systematically and in a statistically robust manner what drives the 
growing inclination to legislate on climate change. The purpose of this paper is to help filling this 
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gap. Its focus is on the domestic drivers of climate change legislation. A parallel paper using the 
same data and similar methods examines international factors (Fankhauser et al., 2015).   
To begin to understand what factors drive the adoption of climate legislation we use a powerful 
global dataset assembled over a series of climate legislation surveys (see Nachmany et al., 2014; 
Townshend et al., 2013; Townshend et al., 2011). The data cover legislative action between 1990 
and the end of 2013 in 66 jurisdictions, constituting 65 countries and the European Union (EU) as 
a block. Together these jurisdictions are responsible for almost 90 per cent of global GHG 
emissions. The data also include countries which are among the most vulnerable to climate 
change. Although not perfect (as discussed below), the data set constitutes one of the richest 
sources of information about climate change legislation currently available (see Dubash et al., 
2013 for a list of alternative data sets). The data set can be downloaded on the website of the 
Grantham Research Institute at the London School of Economics (http://www.lse.ac.uk/ 
GranthamInstitute/legislation/). 
The comprehensive nature of the data allows us study legislative dynamics econometrically and 
draw broadly valid, statistically rigorous conclusions.  We use the data to test a number of 
hypotheses, which are either derived directly from the climate change debate (e.g., on the 
relevance of political orientation) or explore how findings from other areas of public policy apply 
to climate change (e.g., on the importance of a strong executive).  
There have been some prior attempts at exploring the hypotheses we post. There is a considerable 
literature of qualitative comparative studies dealing with climate change policy (e.g., Never, 
2012; Harrison and Sundstrom, 2010; Selin and van Deever, 2009; Compston and Bailey, 2008). 
There is also a quantitative literature exploring the political economy of narrower climate issues 
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(such as treaty ratification) or different environmental problems (e.g., von Stein, 2008; 
Fredriksson et al., 2007; Fredriksson and Gaston, 2000; Neumayer, 2002). However, to our 
knowledge there is as yet no global econometric assessment of the domestic drivers of climate 
change legislation. 
In addition to these studies, other authors have conceptualised the political economy of 
environmental policy (Oates and Portney 2005, Congleton 1992 and Hahn 1990). They highlight 
the role of institutions and the political interaction between governments and interest groups. 
Lachapelle and Paterson (2013), Bernauer and Koubi (2009) and Fredriksson et al. (2005) test 
these theories empirically. Yet rather than focusing on the adoption of laws and regulations, as we 
do, they measure directly the impact of political factors, broadly defined, on particular 
environmental outcomes (such as GHG emissions or urban air quality).  
Other work has explored the theoretical basis of policy formation and change. This is typically 
derived from either game-theoretic or empirical case studies. However, Knox-Hayes (2012) 
presents an option which combines these alternatives. Under her path-dependency and coalition 
stabilisation framework, theory alone cannot explain policy formation. Instead policy formation 
processes need to be placed into a context of a time-series of interactions between conflicting 
interest groups of varying political power. These interactions define a set of starting conditions 
for policy formation, from which groups negotiate iteratively until reaching a stable policy 
position. This position prescribes the direction of policy formation, or the 'way of events' 
(Capano, 2009).   
These processes may occur within a context of 'meta-innovation'; which is the creation of 
situations within which institutional innovators operate (Crouch, 2005). Marcussen and 
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Kaspersen (2007) describe how during such processes of institutional change, stakeholders adopt 
a variety of new roles. Hence the creation of new climate policies and legislation may represent 
not only the outcome of a stabilised climate policy field (Knox-Hayes, 2012), but also the 
creation of an innovated institutional space that may facilitate further legislative development. 
These ideas are particularly relevant to our discussion of the catalytic role of flagship policies.  
The global public goods nature of climate change control adds an important international 
dimension. Climate action is at least in principle subject to international coordination. The two 
dimensions of the problem are studied by Kroll and Shogren (2008), who model climate policy as 
a two-level game played at the national and international level. International factors driving the 
adoption of climate change legislation are discussed in more detail in Fankhauser et al. (2015).  
Here we restrict ourselves to acknowledging their importance and introducing the necessary 
control variables into our empirical analysis. 
Our paper is also linked to the literature on economic policy reform, which explores similar 
questions in a different area of public policy. That literature too emphasises the crucial role 
played by political institutions (see for example Persson and Tabellini, 2000).  It shows how the 
form of government and its ideology influences policy (Persson and Tabellini, 2003), and how the 
presence of veto players complicates policy implementation (Alesina et al., 2006). It also offers 
evidence of electoral cycles, with incumbent governments more likely to adopt favourable 
measures (such as tax cuts) ahead of an election (see for example Besley and Case, 1995 and 
Franzese, 2002).  In our analysis we will explore whether climate change policy, like economic 
policy, is influenced by such political and institutional factors.  
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The rest of the paper is structured as follows. We start in section 2 with a description of the data 
set.  Section 3 then introduces our research hypotheses and the empirical method, and section 4 
provides the results. Conclusions are drawn in Section 5. 
2.  Climate legislation data 
The fourth edition of the Globe Climate Legislation Study (Nachmany et al., 2014) identifies 
close to 500 climate change or climate change-relevant laws in the jurisdictions it covers (see 
Figure 1). The number of climate change laws per country varies from less than five in much of 
Africa and the Middle East to well over twenty in many European states, but also in Indonesia. 
Among the top five GHG emitters, the European Union has 27 active climate change laws, India 
has passed 10 climate laws and the US and Japan have eight climate laws a piece. China, the 
world’s largest GHG emitter, has five climate change laws or equivalent acts.  
The criteria for inclusion in the database are based at on a fairly broad interpretation of climate 
change legislation. Researchers seek out “laws or regulations of comparable status” (Nachmany 
et al., 2014) across a range of sectors, as set out below. As such, the database includes both Acts 
of Parliament and Executive Decrees, Presidential Instructions, and Policies. It is tempting to 
think of the latter as a softer form of legislation and in many instances this is the case. However, 
there are also parliamentary acts that are primarily aspirational, while executive orders like 
China’s 12th Five-year Plan, have strong legal significance.  In line with Nachmany et al. we 
refer to both types as “laws” (Figure 2).  
Laws were identified via government and ministry websites, country reports, policy briefs, library 
searches and in-country support from networks of researchers developed over three previous 
studies. A distinct feature of the surveys is that they are conducted in very close cooperation with 
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members of the parliaments concerned. The data for each country were peer-reviewed both by 
independent experts and (in most cases) an official reviewer nominated by the speaker or 
president of the legislature (usually a legislator, or legislative/executive official; see Nachmany et 
al., 2014 for details). We expect this process to reduce the probability of bias from omitted data. 
The survey aims to cover all sectors and all laws that are relevant to climate policy. Specifically, 
the database includes laws dealing with the following issues (Figure 2): 
 Energy demand, in particular energy efficiency, both in commercial and domestic 
settings; an example is Italy's 2010 Special Fund to Support the Implementation of Energy 
Efficiency Targets.  
 Low-carbon energy supply, often aimed at renewable energy, such as Germany’s 
Renewable Energy Sources Act, which was first passed in 2008 and amended periodically 
since.  
 Curbing carbon emissions through carbon pricing, such as Japan's 2012 Tax Reform Act.  
 Low-carbon transport; for example Argentina's 2007 Decree 140, which among other 
measures establishes minimum efficiency levels for new automobiles.  
 Land Use, Land Use Change and Forestry (LULUCF), and Reduced Emissions from 
Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD+); an example is Indonesia's 2011 
Presidential Instruction for a Moratorium on Forest Concessions.  
 Adaptation to climate change, including for example, coastal defence and climate-related 
disaster management; Gabon's National Climate Change Action Plan (Plan Climat) for 
example contains a spatial plan to reduce vulnerability to coastal erosion.  
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 Research and development on climate change, to identify new products and practices, 
and/or increase local capacity for understanding climate change models and impacts; an 
example is Nepal's Climate Change Policy, a 2011 Executive Order, which sets as a target 
the establishment of a research centre for climate change research and monitoring.  
 New institutional arrangements, to manage and support domestic responses to climate 
change and/or mainstreaming climate change management and financing; a good example 
is Bangladesh's 2009 Climate Change Trust Fund Act, which establishes a new 
institutional framework to fund adaptation activity.    
Most climate laws address more than one of these dimensions. For example, Jordan's 2010 
Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Law deals simultaneously with energy supply and 
energy demand.  
The most comprehensive laws often have an overarching, strategic character and constitute what 
Townshend et al. (2011) call “flagship” legislation. A form of omnibus legislation (Krutz, 2002), 
flagship laws are wide-ranging pieces of high-profile legislation that fundamentally defines a 
country’s approach to climate change. They often (though not always) establish a formal GHG 
emissions target, set up the necessary institutions and/or unify earlier climate policies under one 
umbrella. Examples include the French Grenelle laws (2009/10) and Mexico’s General Law on 
Climate Change of 2012.   
Identifying a flagship law requires judgement, as they are not necessarily legislative acts of 
parliament. Ethiopia’s current flagship for example is the Climate Resilient Green Economy 
Initiative, a government plan adopted in 2011. We rely on the vetting process with 
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parliamentarians (described above) to designate laws that have sufficient strategic significance, 
although we acknowledge that this process probably erred on the side of inclusion. 
There are other important caveats about the data set: it focuses on action at the national level, that 
is, it excludes state, province or city-level activities.  This is a particularly significant omission in 
countries with federal structures, such as Australia, Brazil, Canada and the United States. Climate 
policy at sub-national level is fairly advanced in many of these jurisdictions. Similarly, for the 9 
EU member states in the sample the database excludes laws that merely implement EU 
regulations. Since the EU is also covered as a block, only laws that go beyond EU requirements 
are included.  
The data set does not include analysis of the quality or merit of individual laws (for example, the 
number of exemptions granted), the degree to which a law has been implemented or enforced, nor 
the eventual effect it might have had.  
A particular problem for our study is that when laws are amended the database only records the 
latest version, thus omitting earlier activities. Legal provisions are often tightened over time (as 
for example Switzerland did with its CO2 Act in 2013), but there are also cases of reversal (such 
as the repeal of Canada’s Kyoto Implementation Act in 2012 and Australia’s Clean Energy Act in 
2014). In each case, these events supersede earlier entries.  
 
3.  Hypotheses and analytical method 
The climate legislation study constitutes a panel data set of climate action in 66 jurisdictions over 
24 years, 1990-2013.  This large number of data allows us to adopt a quantitative, statistical 
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approach, which can complement more qualitative comparative studies.  We had to exclude three 
jurisdictions (the EU, the Federated States of Micronesia and the Maldives) as well as laws 
passed in 2013, as data were not available for all explanatory variables. The EU, as a super-
national organisation, would in any case have different legislative dynamics than nation states 
(see Jordan and Lenschow, 2000). However, this still leaves us with over 1,400 country-year 
observations (63 countries over 23 years).   
3.1 The model 
We use the data to estimate different versions of the following equation: 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝐃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾𝐗𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃𝑖 + 𝜈𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡            (1) 
where 𝑦𝑖𝑡 represents the total number of climate change laws adopted in country i at year t, 
excluding flagship laws which are counted separately. The vector Dit indicates the domestic 
factors of interest, which influence the adoption of climate laws, while vector Xit contains a set of 
control variables. The controls include international factors, such as the effect of international 
treaties and international policy diffusion (see Fankhauser et al., 2015 for details), the strength of 
democracy and GDP per capita, which controls for the level of economic development.  
We also include a full set of country and year fixed effects (𝜃𝑖 and 𝑣𝑡) and a random error 
term 𝜀𝑖𝑡. The country effect controls for time-invariant factors such as different legislative 
cultures or a country’s vulnerability to (and therefore concern with) climate change. We know 
from qualitative studies that these factors are important, but they do not vary much over time and 
would therefore be hard to disentangle. The time fixed effect controls for inter-temporal trends 
that are uniform across countries, such as developments in climate science. 
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The full list of explanatory variables and additional controls is provided in Table 1, with 
additional descriptive statistics in Table 2.   
3.2 Research hypotheses 
We use the model to test five hypotheses. The first three are derived specifically from the recent 
debate about climate change and the climate change literature. Hypotheses four and five have 
their origin in the broader literature on the political economy of public policy. Our aim here is to 
test whether pertinent findings extend to the particular case of climate policy. 
Hypothesis 1. The propensity to pass climate laws depends on the quality and quantity of existing 
legislation. While the passage of new laws decreases with the quantity of existing legislation, we 
expect more legislative activity in the presence of a strategic flagship law that provides overall 
direction for climate policy. 
This hypothesis explores aspects of path dependence and the role of strategic frameworks in 
climate legislation, which has been emphasised by Townshend et al. (2011). Climate change 
requires a continuing and enduring programme of policy making. We should therefore expect the 
stock of climate laws to increase over time, as policy makers deal with different aspects of the 
problem, and create contexts for policy development and innovation. However, one would also 
expect the need for further legislation to fall, perhaps non-linearly, as more areas are addressed by 
each additional law.  
Following Townshend et al. (2011) we hypothesise that flagship laws are an important exception 
from this rule. Flagship laws are by definition fairly comprehensive pieces of legislation. 
However, they do not offer a complete treatment of all issues (which would imply fewer 
14 
 
subsequent laws). Instead, they establish institutional frameworks that facilitate and guide future 
policymaking. Legislative activity should therefore increase in the presence of flagship laws.  
We test the hypothesis by looking at three variables (see Table 1): a country’s existing stock of 
climate laws, the square of that stock (which tests for non-linearity) and a flagship dummy 
variable, which takes a value of 1 following the passage of flagship legislation. The definition of 
a flagship law is taken from Nachmany et al. (2014).  
Hypothesis 2. Climate change legislation is affected by the business cycle, although the direction 
of the effect is unclear a priori.  
Climate policy over recent years, particularly in Europe, has been affected by the economic crisis 
of 2008 and its aftermath. The economic slowdown has had a detrimental effect on existing 
polices, such as the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (Neuhoff et al., 2015). It has also triggered a 
debate about the scope for climate policy in difficult economic times.  
There are two sides to the argument. On the one hand, concern for the environment may have less 
political traction during a recession, when issues like growth and employment take centre stage. 
There is evidence that interest in the environment tends to wane in difficult economic times 
(Kahn and Kotchen, 2010). On the other hand, green investment can be an effective fiscal 
stimulus, as argued forcefully by Zenghelis (2012). Many climate investments meet closely the 
criteria for an effective fiscal stimulus (Bowen and Stern, 2010; Bowen et al., 2009; see Fischer 
and Springborn, 2011 for a broader discussion), which could make them an attractive policy 
option during economic crises.  
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Most aspects of the business cycle that are relevant to this debate – output, investment, 
employment, fiscal balance – are pro-cyclical.  That is, their movements are correlated. For our 
purposes it is therefore sufficient to include just one business cycle variable, and we choose one 
that is widely used in macroeconomics. The cyclical component of GDP, calculated by employing 
a Hodrick-Prescott filter (see e.g. Doda, 2014), measures the deviation of GDP from its long-term 
structural trend. If the variable is significant we can draw conclusions on which of the two a 
priori effects is dominant in practice. Separately, we also explore whether attitudes to the 
economic cycle depend on political orientation by interacting the business cycle variable with the 
political orientation dummy (see Tables 1, 2). 
Hypothesis 3. Left-wing and right-wing governments have different attitudes to climate change 
legislation. Specifically, we expect left-wing governments to be more inclined to pass climate 
legislation.  
A striking feature of the climate change debate over recent years has been the rise in climate 
scepticism within right-of-centre political parties, certainly in Anglo-Saxon countries (see 
McCright and Dunlap, 2011a, b; and Painter and Ashe, 2012). Earlier studies have found that left-
of-centre governments are generally more inclined to legislate on the environment (Neumayer, 
2003). Although the impact of party politics on environmental policy can be complex (Folke, 
2014), we should therefore expect different trends in climate legislation depending on the 
political orientation of the parties in power (which in turn reflects the political views of voters, 
see Lee et al., 2004).  
We test this hypothesis by including a political orientation dummy, which takes a value of 1 for 
left-wing governments and 0 for centre or right-of-centre governments (see Tables 1, 2). The data 
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are from the World Bank dataset of political institutions (DPI), originally compiled by Beck et al. 
(2001) and updated in 2012. 
Hypothesis 4. Like other areas of public policy, climate change legislation is affected by the 
electoral cycle. We expect fewer new laws in the year immediately before and in the year of a 
general election. 
Electoral cycles have been observed in other areas of public policy, where controversial measures 
are often avoided ahead of an election (Besley and Case, 1995; Persson and Tabellini, 2003; List 
and Sturm, 2006).  Although climate policy can entail a variety of measures, not all of which are 
equally controversial (e.g. energy efficiency support vs. a carbon tax), we expect the same pattern 
to hold for climate legislation.  
We test the hypothesis by including separate dummy variables for the year of a general election 
and the year immediately before an election. The data again come from the World Bank database 
of political institutions (after Beck et al., 2001). Arguably, the hypothesis is more pertinent to 
strong democratic systems and we test this by interacting the election year variable with a 
democracy dummy (derived from the polity2 variable in the Polity IV data set, see Tables 1, 2). 
Hypothesis 5. Strong governments find it easier to pass climate legislation. We therefore expect 
more laws at times when the ruling party has a clear parliamentary majority.  
Climate policy engenders strong political views and the response of powerful vested interests. As 
in other areas of public policy (Alesina et al., 2006; Persson and Tabellini, 2003), we would 
expect a strong and unified executive to be better able to deal with these pressures. All else equal, 
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strong governments that enjoy a majority in parliament can therefore be expected to pass more 
climate legislation.   
We test the hypothesis through a “unified government” dummy, taken from the World Bank DPI, 
which assumes a value of 1 if the party of the executive has an absolute majority in all relevant 
chambers of the legislative. This follows Alesina et al. (2006), although we acknowledge that the 
size of that majority may also matter (Fredriksson et al., 2011). 
3.2 Estimation strategy 
In our main calculations we estimate equation (1) with general (non-flagship) laws as the 
dependent variable, using a negative binomial fixed effects model, where the log of the expected 
count is a function of the predictor variables.  
The count model is suitable since we are dealing with a count dependent variable characterized 
by over-dispersion (i.e. the mean is lower than the variance) and events (the passage of laws) that 
a country can experience more than once (Allison and Waterman, 2002; Cameron and Trivedi, 
1998, 2010). These features prevent the use of hazard models, which have been employed to 
study policy adoption elsewhere (e.g., Berry and Berry, 1990, 1992). The negative binomial is 
also best suited to deal with the large number of zero entries (i.e. country-years without 
legislative action), which represent about 80 per cent of all observations. 
We will comment mainly on the sign and the significance of different variables, but the negative 
binomial regression coefficients also have a numerical meaning. They are semi-elasticities, that 
is, they measure the change in the log of expected law counts when the predictor variable changes 
by one unit, keeping other predictor variables constant. 
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We run several robustness checks to support the main results. First we provide results from an 
alternative to the negative binomial, the Poisson fixed effects model, which is also suitable to 
analyse count data. The Poisson model is a special case of the negative binomial (when the over-
dispersion parameter is close to zero). If data are over-dispersed the negative binomial is 
generally a better estimator, and it also deals with the excess of zeros. However, the Poisson with 
robust standard errors can still account for some degree of over-dispersion. It is therefore a useful 
robustness check.  
 
A second robustness check corroborates the role played by flagship legislation (hypothesis 1). 
Flagship laws are a special type of legislation and to verify their effect we run a “placebo test”, 
whereby the flagship variable is replaced by a dummy for a randomly chosen non-flagship law. 
The expectation is that the flagship variable would be statistically significant, but not the placebo 
variable. 
A third robustness check uses a sharper delineation between democratic and non-democratic 
systems to highlight the different legislative dynamics in democracies. We run a restricted 
sample, which only includes full democracies (defined as having a polity2 score of 6 or more) 
and autocracies (with a polity2 score of -6 or less). Countries with semi-democratic systems 
(scores between -5 and +5) are excluded. Although the predictive power of this regression is 
weaker, given the smaller sample size, it allows for a clearer distinction in democratic practices. 
In addition we will report in passing on additional checks and alternative specifications, which 
we used to corroborate the main results. 
4. Empirical results   
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Our core results are shown in Table 3. The most basic regression (column 1) excludes interaction 
terms and specifies democracy as a continuous variable over the full range provided by polity2 
(see Table 2). In column (2) we include two interaction terms and democracy is defined as a 
dummy variable, which takes value one if a country is a democracy (has a polity2 score of 6 or 
more).  The results of the robustness checks are shown in Table 4.  
4.1 The role of existing legislation (hypothesis 1) 
The results on the role of existing climate laws are as anticipated, and we cannot reject hypothesis 
1. Climate legislation exhibits an element of path dependence, as predicted. A larger stock of 
climate laws reduces the propensity to legislate further. This quantity effect is non-linear and 
levels off over time; the square term is also significant. However, we find that the nature of laws 
also matters. The presence of prior flagship legislation is a strong determinant of subsequent 
climate action. The flagship dummy is positive and significant in all regressions in Table 3.  
The robustness checks corroborate these results (Table 4). The findings are not affected by the 
choice of a Poisson model (column 1), and the placebo test is also conclusive (column 2): The 
relevant coefficient becomes insignificant if we replace the flagship laws identified in Nachmany 
et al. (2014) with random (placebo) laws. We further experimented with stricter definitions for 
flagship legislation (e.g., by focusing on legislative acts only or excluding policies). The results 
are consistent, although because of the smaller number of flagships they are weaker and the effect 
becomes insignificant.   
The findings underline the significance of a strategic approach to climate policy. The flagships 
are often among the first policies to be promulgated or issued by a country, indicating a stabilised 
policy field (Knox-Hayes, 2012), and constituting a non-linearity in policy making (Capano, 
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2009). With their breadth many flagship laws constitute a form of omnibus legislation. These are 
'must-pass' laws that combine numerous measures from different policy areas into one piece of 
legislation (Krutz, 2002). This has the effect of 'suffocating' the constituent elements of the 
legislation such that each receives relatively little scrutiny, thus providing a means to govern on a 
controversial issue in a difficult political context. 
Flagship laws create a space for subsequent negotiation and policy formation. Once a general 
climate change framework is set, the nature of subsequent legislation may change, as countries 
move from policy design to implementation (Townshend et al., 2011). We cannot test this claim 
statistically, but there is anecdotal evidence in its support. For example, in the UK the 2008 
Climate Change Act, which sets mandatory medium and long-term carbon targets, was followed 
by the 2013 Energy Act, which adjusted energy market arrangements in light of the new 
commitments. 
4.2 The role of the business cycle (hypothesis 2) 
We offer two competing explanations about the impact of economic factors on climate 
legislation. One explanation suggests a negative correlation with the business cycle: voter interest 
in climate policy wanes in difficult times. The second explanation suggests a positive 
relationship: certain climate investments may be attractive as a fiscal stimulus for a sluggish 
economy. The results in Tables 3 (and the robustness checks of Table 4) do not allow us to 
identify which of the two effects dominates. The business cycle variable is insignificant, perhaps 
because the two effects are of similar size and cancel each other out.  
However there is one significant result, which concerns the interaction of the business cycle 
variable with the left-wing dummy for political orientation (Table 3, column 2). The term has a 
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negative sign, which suggests left-wing governments are more inclined than right-wing 
governments to pass climate legislation in difficult economic times.  
It would be dangerous to over-interpret this result. The finding probably reflects wider 
differences in the approach to economic management between left-wing and right-wing parties. 
However, it is possible that left-leaning politicians, who tend to have greater confidence in 
Keynesian counter-cyclical policies, might also have a greater belief in green investment as a 
potential fiscal stimulus, as argued by Zenghelis (2012). Anecdotal support for this claim comes 
from the UK. At the height of the global economic crisis in 2009, the centre-left Labour 
government passed the Community Energy Saving Programme. This aimed at improving energy 
efficiency in low-income households, and was also a good stimulus measure. The government 
had internal targets about the green component of its stimulus package at the time.  
4.3 Party-political orientation (hypothesis 3) 
Contrary to initial expectations, we do not find a difference in legislative activity between left- 
and right-wing governments in Table 3. The political-orientation dummy is not significant, which 
leads us to reject hypothesis 3. The result is robust to our sensitivity checks (Table 4) and to 
separate experiments with split-sample regressions that focus solely on periods of left-wing or 
right-wing administration.  
It appears that climate policy is, in general, a fairly bipartisan affair. This is consistent with the 
observation of Townshend et al. (2011) that flagship laws are frequently passed with bipartisan 
support. The UK’s flagship law, the Climate Change Act of 2008, for example, was passed under 
a Labour government, but with near unanimous support from all political parties (Fankhauser, 
2013).  
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There are of course differences in approaches to climate policy between left-wing and right-wing 
governments, but they do not concern the propensity to legislate (i.e., the overall number of 
laws). They might instead concern the choice of policy instruments, the role of targets or attitudes 
to particular technologies (such as nuclear energy). We have already seen that left-wing 
governments also respond differently to the economic cycle. Fankhauser et al. (2015) further find 
that right-wing governments are more susceptible to external reputation effects, issuing more 
legislation than left-wing governments after hosting a global climate summit. 
Our results seem at odds with the well-documented evidence of right-wing climate scepticism in 
Anglo-Saxon countries (McCright and Dunlap, 2011a, b; Painter and Ashe, 2012). To test 
whether these countries have different party-political dynamics, we ran the regression model with 
a highly restrictive sample of Anglo-Saxon countries only (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, UK 
and US). This sample is extremely small, therefore the results are not very robust. Yet they 
indicate a statistically significant difference between left and right-wing governments. The latter 
are less inclined to pass climate legislation. This suggests that right-wing climate-scepticism may 
be restricted to certain polities, and that within these it does indeed, affect climate legislation. 
 
 
4.4 The electoral cycle (hypothesis 4) 
At first glance, climate legislation appears to differ from other areas of public policy in that there 
is no evidence of an electoral cycle. The electoral cycle dummies in Table 3 are either 
insignificant or even positive. However, this is due primarily to the widely varying levels of 
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democracy observed in our study countries. While most of them are functioning democracies, the 
sample also includes some countries with very weak electoral systems. The mean score of the 
democracy variable in the sample is 5, a full point below the democracy threshold of 6 (Table 2). 
If we distinguish different levels of democracy, we find that in well-developed democratic 
systems the electoral cycle does matter. This is shown by the significant and negative coefficient 
for the interaction term between the year-of-election and a democracy dummy (Table 3, column 
2). We can therefore not reject hypothesis 3 in this narrower sense. The robustness check with a 
tighter democracy definition (democracies vs autocracies; Table 4, column 3) corroborates the 
result. 
The finding implies that climate legislation is not generally seen as a vote winner. It seems that in 
the climate change policy mix of most countries, the balance between voter-pleasing schemes 
(e.g. subsidies for energy efficient homes) and controversial measures like new taxes is tilted 
towards the latter.   
The public debate on climate policy is indeed framed predominantly negatively in terms of the 
impact climate action might have on fuel poverty and business competitiveness (see Fankhauser, 
2013). Attempts to frame the debate in terms of new growth opportunities or other side-benefits 
are rare. A notable example is South Korea’s flagship climate change law, the 2009 Framework 
Act on Low Carbon Green Growth. The Act seeks to position the country as a future leader in the 
emerging green economy. Green growth also features in Rwanda’s National Strategy on Climate 
Change and Low Carbon Development of 2011, but these tend to be the exceptions.  
4.5 The strength of government (hypothesis 5) 
24 
 
Our results are consistent with the view that strong government is important for climate 
legislation. The unified-government variable is significant and positive in all regressions (Tables 
3, 4). Hypothesis 5 cannot be rejected. 
Governments with a majority in all chambers of the legislature find it easier to legislate and are 
likely to pass more laws overall, not just laws related to climate change. However, the often 
contested nature of climate policy makes a strong executive particularly important in the climate 
change field. Of course, there is lobbying both in favour and against climate action, and the 
government effect may cut both ways. Fredriksson et al. (2007) found that the combination of a 
corruptible government and a strong environmental lobby significantly accelerated ratification of 
the Kyoto Protocol. 
Even with a strong government one would expect the adoption of climate change laws to be 
influenced by lobby groups. We find some evidence of this in our data. There is a significant 
positive correlation between the stock of climate change laws in a country and the number of 
national member organisations in the International Union for the Conservation of Nature (pearson 
correlation= 0.31, p=0.01).  Conversely, the stock of laws is negatively correlated with the share 
of fossil fuel and mining exports in a country, although that relationship is not statistically 
significant (pearson correlation= -0.18, p=0.16). Whilst this is not conclusive evidence of the 
effect of lobbying, it underscores the important role that special interest groups can potentially 
play in climate change legislation.  
5.  Conclusions 
Climate change is a global problem that requires an international response. However, the 
domestic actions of nation states and subnational entities are receiving increasing attention. This 
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is because international commitments need to be backed up by domestic action to be credible. 
Furthermore, global climate policy is moving toward an international agreement that is built 
“bottom up” from countries’ domestic commitments, rather than a binding global treaty. 
The climate legislation data we use paint a picture of increasingly widespread national action on 
climate change (see Figure 1 above). The laws are motivated by a combination of international 
factors and domestic political economy considerations. This paper only focuses on the latter, but 
we recognise that both aspects are important and that there are (as yet under-researched) 
synergies between them. We also recognise that the main driver for legislation is not always 
exclusively or even primarily concern about anthropogenic climate change. Many laws are 
couched in terms of alternative objectives like green growth, energy security or air pollution, 
sometimes wrapped within omnibus legislation. 
We do not assess the environmental impact of individual laws, nor what the optimal level of 
climate change rule-making might be. We differentiate only between major policy non-linearities 
called 'flagship' legislation and all other laws. Otherwise, our data record only the total number of 
laws, with no quantification of their astuteness, scope or level of ambition. Differences in number 
may also simply reflect different legislative practices: what requires new legislation in one 
country (as climate policy did in the UK) may be addressed through existing regulation in another 
(as happened in the US). Regardless, climate change is the result of market failure (Stern, 2007), 
hence policy intervention is essential to achieve the socially desirable outcome. The growing 
number of climate laws is therefore encouraging. 
A novel aspect of this paper is the use of a data set that seeks to comprehensively capture all 
legislation relevant to climate change. This has both advantages and disadvantages. On the one 
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hand, a global analysis can offer fewer nuances than the detailed case studies of comparative 
analysis. We also deal with a less tightly defined experiment than quantitative studies like von 
Stein (2008) and Fredriksson and Gaston (2000), who focus just on treaty ratification. This makes 
it harder to identify trends statistically. On the other hand, the results we do obtain are statistically 
robust and give rise to broad, externally valid conclusions. These allow us to explore some 
widely-held beliefs about climate policy.  
One such belief is that climate change is primarily a left-wing political issue. Whilst there is 
evidence that a climate-sceptic right has affected the passage of climate change legislation in 
countries like Australia, Canada and the US, in global terms right-wing climate scepticism 
appears to be a predominantly Anglo-Saxon phenomenon. Looking across all countries we find 
that climate change is in fact a strongly bipartisan concern. Although there are differences in 
emphasis, we find no significant difference between left-wing and right-wing governments in 
terms of overall climate legislation.  
Similarly, we find no evidence that the recent economic crisis has affected the number of climate 
change laws, although we can hypothesise that it might have changed their ambition. In some 
cases, low-carbon investment might even be seen as a potential fiscal stimulus, particularly by 
left-wing governments, which tend to have a more interventionist approach to economic policy.  
Despite its international dimension the political economy of climate legislation appears to be very 
similar to other types of public policy. Climate change engenders strong views and meaningful 
policies in areas like energy or deforestation will meet powerful vested interests. The adoption of 
climate laws is therefore aided by a strong executive that is able to successfully challenge interest 
groups. Yet even strong governments are reluctant to pass climate laws immediately before an 
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election. In this respect climate change is not different to other reform efforts, and we were able 
to corroborate the pertinent results from other areas of public policy (Besley and Case, 1995; 
Persson and Tabellini, 2003; List and Sturm, 2006).  
Perhaps our most important finding is the powerful effect of adopting a strategic approach to 
climate legislation. Our data identify an overarching flagship law in most study countries. The 
development of flagship laws constitutes an initial radical change, around which actors have 
coalesced to negotiate a path of policy formation. The presence of flagship legislation is therefore 
a powerful predictor of further climate legislation, creating consensus and clarity about the future 
direction of travel. 
This suggests an element of path dependency in climate change policy. However, a key element 
of path dependency is irreversibility. The notion of irreversibility in climate change policy is 
undermined somewhat by the experience of Canada and Australia, both of which have repealed 
flagship legislation in recent years (Townshend et al., 2013; Nachmany et al., 2014). Nonetheless, 
we suggest that the legislative trajectories of even these outlier countries have still been altered.  
Important research questions remain. There is scope for further analysis to establish how political 
economy factors, like pressure groups, manifest themselves in different institutional contexts and 
how they affect not just the quantity, but also the quality of legislation. For example, there is a 
suspicion that industry pressure tends to result in excessively generous compensation settlements 
(e.g.  Martin et al., 2014).  
Similarly, creating a legal basis for climate change policy is only the first step. Laws on the 
statute books are not perfectly implemented, since enforcement is moderated by domestic 
institutional conditions (see Collins et al., 2011 for a forestry example). This paper does not 
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assess the quality of legal provisions nor progress in their implementation. Nor do we have much 
to say about the success or failure of different legislative approaches. These are important topics 
for future research. From a normative point of view, there is a need for more evaluative and 
comparative assessments to establish the relative merit of different legal and policy approaches. 
Policy makers would like to know which approaches work and which ones do not.  
The political economy of climate legislation needs to be better understood. We believe our results 
help both to highlight this important area of public policy, and to provide a nascent understanding 
of its domestic drivers. 
 
References 
Alesina, A., Ardagna, S., Trebbi, F., 2006, Who Adjusts and When: on the Political Economy of 
Reforms, NBER Working Paper 12049. 
 
Allison, P. D. and Waterman, R. P., 2002. Fixed–Effects Negative Binomial Regression Models. 
Sociological Methodology, 32: 247–265 
 
Beck, T., Clarke, G., Groff, A., Keefer, P., Walsh, P., 2001, New Tools in Comparative Political 
Economy: the Database of Political Institutions, The World Bank Economic Review, 15 (1), 165-
176. 
 
Besley, T., and A. Case, 1995. Does Electoral Accountability Affect Economic Policy Choices? 
Evidence from Gubernatorial Term Limits, Quarterly Journal of Economics, CX (1995), 769-
798. 
 
Bernauer, T. and V. Koubi, 2009. Effects of Political Institutions on Air Quality Ecological 
Economics, 68(5): 1355-1365. 
 
Bernstein, S. and B. Cashore. 2012. “Complex Global Governance and Domestic Policies: Four 
Pathways of Influence”. International Affairs, 88(3): 585–604 
 
Berry, F. and W. Berry. 1990. “State Lottery Adoptions as Policy Innovations: An Event History 
Analysis”, American Political Science Review 84: 395-415. 
 
Berry, F. and W. Berry. 1992.  “Tax Innovation by American States: Capitalizing on Political 
Opportunity”, American Journal of Political Science 36: 715-742. 
 
29 
 
Bowen, A., S. Fankhauser, N. Stern, and D. Zenghelis (2009). An outline of the case for a "green" 
stimulus. Policy Brief, Grantham Research Institute, London School of Economics, March. 
 
Bowen, A., and N. Stern. 2010. Environmental policy and the economic downturn. Oxford 
Review of Economic Policy, 26(2), 137-163. 
 
Busch, P.O.,  H. Jörgens and K. Tews. 2005. “The Global Diffusion of Regulatory Instruments: 
The Making of a New International Environmental Regime”. The Annals of the American 
Academy of Political and Social Science 598: 146- 167. 
Cameron, A. C. and  Trivedi, P. K., 1998. Regression Analysis of Count Data.  New 
York:  Cambridge Press. 
Cameron, A. C., and P. K. Trivedi, 2010. Microeconometrics Using Stata. Rev. ed. College 
Station, TX: Stata Press. 2013. 
 
Capano, G. 2009. Understanding policy change as an epistemological and theoretical problem. 
Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis, 11(1), 7-31. 
 
Collins,  M, E. Macdonald, L. Clayton, I. Dunggio, D. Macdonald, E. Milner-Gulland. 2011. 
“Wildlife conservation and reduced emissions from deforestation in a case study of Nantu 
Wildlife Reserve, Sulawesi: An institutional framework for REDD implementation,”,  
Environmental Science & Policy, 14(6): 709-718, 
 
Compston, H. and I. Bailey. 2008. Turning down the heat: The politics of climate policy in 
affluent democracies. London: Palgrave Macmillan. 
 
Congleton, R. 1992. Political Institutions and Pollution Control. Review of Economics and 
Statistics 74: 412–21. 
 
Crouch, C. 2005. Capitalist Diversity and Change: Recombinant Governance and Institutional 
Entrepreneurs. Oxford: OUP. 
 
Doda, B. 2014. Evidence on business cycles and emissions, Journal of Macroeconomics, , 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jmacro.2014.01.003. 
 
Dubash, N.K., M. Hagemann, N. Höhne and P. Upadhyaya, 2013. Developments in national 
climate change mitigation legislation and strategy, Climate Policy, 13:6, 649-664. 
 
Falkner, R., ed.  2013. The Handbook of Global Climate and Environment Policy. Chicester: 
Wiley-Blackwell. 
 
Fankhauser, S. 2013.  A Practitioner’s Guide to a Low-Carbon Economy: Lessons from the UK, 
Climate Policy, 13(3): 345-362. 
 
Fankhauser, S., C. Gennaioli and M. Collins. 2015.  “Do international factors influence the 
passage of climate change legislation?” Climate Policy, forthcoming. 
30 
 
 
Fischer, C., and M. Springborn. 2011. Emissions targets and the real business cycle: Intensity 
targets versus caps or taxes. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 62(3), 352-
366. 
 
Folke, O. 2014. Shades of brown and green: Party effects in proportional election systems. 
Journal of the European Economic Association, forthcoming. 
 
Franzese,  R. 2002. Electoral and Partisan Cycles in Economic Policies and Outcomes.  
Annual Review of Political Science  5: 369-421. 
 
Fredriksson, P and N. Gaston. 2000. Ratification of the 1992 Climate Change Convention: What 
Determines Legislative Delay? Public Choice 104: 345–368, 2000. 
 
Fredriksson, P., E. Neumayer, R. Damiana, and S. Gates. 2005. Environmentalism, Democracy, 
and Pollution Control, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 49 (2): 343-365 
 
Fredriksson, P. G., Neumayer, E., and Ujhelyi, G. 2007. Kyoto Protocol cooperation: does 
government corruption facilitate environmental lobbying? Public Choice, 133(1), 231–251 
 
Fredriksson, P. G., Wang, L., and Mamun, K. A. 2011. Are politicians office or policy motivated? 
The case of US governors' environmental policies. Journal of Environmental Economics and 
Management, 62(2), 241-253. 
 
Hahn, R. 1990. The Political Economy of Environmental Regulation: Towards a Unifying 
Framework Public Choice 65: 21–47. 
 
Harrison, K., and L. Sundstrom, eds. 2010. Global commons, domestic decisions: The 
comparative politics of climate change. Boston, MA: MIT Press. 
 
Jordan, A. and A. Lenschow, 2000. Greening the European Union: What Can Be Learned From 
the Leaders of EU Environmental Policy, European Environment 10: 109-120. 
 
Kahn, M.  and Kotchen, M. 2010. Environmental concern and the business cycle: The chilling 
effect of recession. Working paper No w16241, National Bureau of Economic Research. 
 
Kern, K., H. Jörgens, and M. Jänicke. 2001. The Diffusion of Environmental Policy Innovations: 
A Contribution to the Globalisation of Environmental Policy. Discussion Paper FS II 01 - 302, 
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, Berlin. 
 
Knox-Hayes, J. 2012. Negotiating climate legislation: Policy path dependence and coalition 
stabilization. Regulation & Governance, 6: 545–567. 
 
Kroll, S. and J. Shogren. 2008. Domestic politics and climate change: international public goods 
in two-level games, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 21:4, 563-583. 
 
31 
 
Krutz, G. S. 2002. Omnibus legislation: an institutional reaction to the rise of new issues. 
Baumgartner and Jones. 
 
Lachapelle, E and M. Paterson, 2013.  Drivers of national climate policy, Climate 
Policy, 13:5, 547-571. 
 
Lee, D. S., Moretti, E., and Butler, M. J. 2004. Do voters affect or elect policies? Evidence from 
the US House. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 119 (3): 807-859. 
 
List, J., and D. Sturm, 2006, How Elections Matter: Theory and Evidence from Environmental 
Policy, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 121(4), pp.1249-1281. 
 
Lockwood, M.,2013. The political sustainability of climate policy: The case of the UK Climate 
Change Act. Global Environmental Change, 23(5), 1339-1348. 
 
Marcussen, M. and Kaspersen, L. 2007. Globalization and institutional competitiveness. 
Regulation & Governance, 1: 183–196. 
 
Martin R, Muuls M, de Preux L and Wagner U. 2014. “Industry Compensation under Relocation 
Risk: A Firm-Level Analysis of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme”, American Economic 
Review, 104: 2482-2508 
 
McCright, A.  and R. Dunlap, 2011a. “The politicization of climate change and polarization in the 
American public's views of global warming, 2001–2010. The Sociological Quarterly, 52(2), 155-
194. 
 
McCright, A. and R. Dunlap, 2011b. Cool dudes: The denial of climate change among 
conservative white males in the United States. Global Environmental Change, 21(4), 1163-1172. 
 
Nachmany, M., Fankhauser, S., Townshend, T., Collins, M. Landesman, T., Matthews, A., Pavese, 
C., Rietig, K., Schleifer, P. and Setzer, J.  2014. The GLOBE Climate Legislation Study: A Review 
of Climate Change Legislation in 66 Countries. Fourth Edition. London: GLOBE International 
and Grantham Research Institute, London School of Economics. 
 
Neuhoff, K., Acworth, W., Betz, R., Burtraw, D., Cludius, J., Fell, H., Hepburn, C., Holt, C., 
Jotzo, F., Kollenberg, S., Landis, F., Salant, S., Schopp, A., Shobe, W., Taschini, L., Trotignon, 
R., 2015. Is a Market Stability Reserve likely to improve the functioning of the EU ETS? Evidence 
from a model comparison exercise. Berlin: Climate Strategies. 
 
Neumayer, E. 2003. Are left-wing party strength and corporatism good for the environment? 
Evidence from panel analysis of air pollution in OECD countries, Ecological Economics, 45(2): 
203-220. 
 
Neumayer, E., 2002. Do democracies exhibit stronger international environmental 
commitment? A cross-country analysis. Journal of peace research, 39 (2). 
 
32 
 
Never, B., 2012. Who drives change? Comparing the evolution of domestic climate governance 
in India and South Africa. Journal of Environment and Development, 21(3), 362-387. 
 
Never, B and J. Betz., 2014. Comparing the Climate Policy Performance of Emerging 
Economies, World Development, 59: 1-15. 
 
Oates, W., and Portney, P., 2003, The Political Economy of Environmental Policy, K. Mäler and 
J. Vincent, eds,  Handbook of Environmental Economics, Amsterdam: North-Holland/Elsevier. 
 
Painter, J. and T. Ashe, 2012. Cross-national comparison of the presence of climate scepticism in 
the print media in six countries, 2007–10. Environmental Research Letters, 7(4): 044005. 
 
Persson, T., and Tabellini, G., 2000. Political Economics: Explaining Economic Policy. 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
 
Persson, T., and Tabellini, G., 2003. Do electoral cycles differ across political systems?, IGIER 
Working Paper. 
 
Selin, H. and S. van Deveer. 2009. Changing climates in North American politics institutions, 
policymaking, and multilevel governance. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
 
Stern, N. 2007. The Economics of Climate Change. The Stern Review. Cambridge: CUP. 
 
Townshend, T., S. Fankhauser, R. Aybar, M. Collins, T. Landesman, M Nachmany and C Pavese,  
2013.  How National Legislation Can Help to Solve Climate Change,  Nature Climate Change, 
3(May): 430-432. 
 
Townshend, T., S. Fankhauser,  A. Matthews, J. Liu, T. Narciso and N. Pauli  (2012). The Second 
GLOBE Climate Legislation Survey, Globe International and Grantham Research Institute, 
London School of Economics, April. 
 
Townshend, T., S. Fankhauser,  A. Matthews, C. Feger, J. Liu and T. Narciso,  2011. Legislating 
Climate Change at the National Level, Environment 53(5): 5-16.   
 
Von Stein, J. 2008. The international law and politics of climate change: ratification of the United 
Nations Framework Convention and the Kyoto Protocol. The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 
52(2), 243–268. 
 
Zenghelis, D.  2012. A strategy for Restoring Confidence and Economic Growth through Green 
Investment and Innovation. Policy briefs, Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and 
the Environment, London School of Economics 
 
 
 
33 
 
The political economy of passing climate change legislation:  
Evidence from a survey  
 
Tables and Figures  
  Table 1. Variable definitions 
All_laws (count) 
Flagship law 
Domestic Stock 
Domestic_sq 
Business cycle 
Year of an election           
Year before an election      
Unified government  
 
Left-wing government 
Democracy 
Host 
Policy Diffusion 
Kyoto 
logGDP 
Number of laws passed in a country in a given year 
dummy=1 for each country passing a flagship law in the year of the pass and following years. 
Total number of laws passed in a country until time t-1 
Square of the Domestic Stock 
cyclical component of the Hodrick-Prescott filtered log of real GDP 
dummy=1 in the year of elections 
dummy=1 in the year before the elections 
dummy=1 when the party of the executive has an absolute majority in the houses that have 
lawmaking powers  
dummy=1 for left-wing governments 
Polity2 score taking values -10 to 10 (increasing in the level of democracy) 
dummy=1 for each country hosting a meeting, in the year of the meeting and in the two years after 
number of laws passed in all other countries until time t-1  
dummy=1 for the four years after Kyoto (1998-2001) 
log of real gdp per capita 
 
    Table 2. Descriptive Statistics 
Variable mean Sd min Max Observations. 
All_laws (count) 0.2532 0.6174 0 5 1,449 
Flagship law 0.1601 0.3668 0 1 1,449 
Domestic Stock 1.6125 2.4966 0 23 1,386 
Domestic_sq 8.829 32.3979 0 529 1,386 
Business cycle ~0 0.1194 -.7338 .4351 1,447 
Year of election 0.2104 0.4077 0 1 1,449 
Year before election 0.2106 0.4079 0 1 1,449 
Unified government 0.4320 0.4955 0 1 1,449 
Left-wing government 0.3409 0.4741 0 1 1,449 
Democracy 5.0241 5.9256 -10 10 1,447 
Host 
 
0.0379 0.1911 0 1 1,449 
Policy Diffusion 99.2178 100.6524 2 334 1,386 
Kyoto 0.1739 0.3791 0 1 1,449 
logGDP 8,4003 2,3854 4.463 23,2697 1,447 
    Note: The statistics refer to country-year observations 
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Table 3. Analysis of climate legislation: All laws (years: 1990-2012). Model: Negative Binomial Fixed Effects. 
   
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES   
   
Flagship law 0.429* 0.461* 
 (0.244) (0.253) 
Domestic Stock -0.339*** -0.328*** 
 (0.081) (0.086) 
Domestic_sq. 0.012*** 0.012*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) 
Business Cycle -0.153 0.348 
 (0.647) (0.727) 
Year of election 0.000 0.548** 
 (0.138) (0.216) 
Year before election -0.100 -0.116 
 (0.147) (0.148) 
Unified government 0.609** 0.550** 
 (0.272) (0.270) 
Left-wing 0.079 0.068 
 (0.216) (0.217) 
Democracya 0.089* 0.728* 
 (0.046) (0.391) 
Democracy*Y_Election  -0.646** 
  (0.265) 
Left*Business_cycle  -1.518* 
  (0.879) 
   
Full set of control variables YES YES 
Country FE YES YES 
Year FE YES YES 
Obs. 1,273 1,273 
Clustered standard errors at the country level in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Control variables included: 
Policy Diffusion, Kyoto, Host, log of GDP. 
a
 Democracy is a continuous variable (Polity2 score) in regression 1 and a binary variable in regression 2.(1 for a score of 6 or higher, 0 
otherwise) 
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         Table 4. Robustness checks on the analysis of climate legislation: All laws (years: 1990-2012).  
 Poisson Model Placebo on Flagship      Democracy vs Autocracy 
AAutocracieAAutocraciesA
Autocracies 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES    
    
Flagship law 0.461* 0.014 0.308 
 (0.251) (0.319) (0.268) 
Domestic Stock -0.328*** -0.311*** -0.305*** 
 (0.085) (0.089) (0.080) 
Domestic_sq. 0.012*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Business Cycle 0.348 0.170 0.884 
 (0.721) (0.991) (0.783) 
Year of election 0.548** 0.464* 0.425 
 (0.214) (0.260) (0.262) 
Year before election -0.116 -0.076 -0.046 
 (0.147) (0.137) (0.154) 
Unified government 0.550** 0.617** 0.598** 
 (0.268) (0.300) (0.300) 
Left-wing 0.068 0.171 0.028 
 (0.215) (0.203) (0.219) 
Democracy 0.728* 0.683 1.765*** 
 (0.388) (0.540) (0.486) 
Democracy*Y_Election -0.646** -0.612** -0.492* 
 (0.263) (0.303) (0.287) 
Left*Business_cycle -1.518* -1.427 -2.038** 
 (0.871) (1.010) (0.961) 
    
Full set of control variables YES YES YES 
Country FE YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES 
Obs. 1,264 1,273 1,018 
In column (1) robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. In columns (2) and (3) clustered standard errors at the country  
level in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. In all columns control variables included: Policy Diffusion, Kyoto, Host, log of GDP. The 
democracy variable is binary (value of 1 for a polity2 score ≥ 6; value of 0 for a score < 6 in columns (1), (2) and ≤ -6 in column (3). 
 
 
 
 
  
36 
 
Figure 1. Number of climate change laws at end-2013 
 
 
Source: Nachmany et al.(2014)
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Figure 2: Schematic of climate change laws in the database 
 
 
 
 
Source: own chart, based on Nachmany et al. (2014) 
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